• Book Reviews
• Cultural Diversity
• Project Management
• Risk
• Technology

You are here:

1. Home »
2. PM Topics »
3. Churchill's Decision-Making Environment

Churchill’s Decision-Making Environment

Today's organizations are faced with the problem of instilling improved decision-making with their employees at all levels. Some organizations have been able to achieve a leadership position through the use of tools like executive dashboards and real-time event models, and processes for institutionalized decision-making and competitive intelligence analysis. In the right combination, these can give employees an enterprise view of their business and the ability to engage in insightful customer dialogues based on meaningful intelligence. 

Today's organizations are faced with the problem of instilling improved decision-making with their employees at all levels. Some organizations have been able to achieve a leadership position through the use of tools like executive dashboards and real-time event models, and processes for institutionalized decision-making and competitive intelligence analysis. In the right combination, these can give employees an enterprise view of their business and the ability to engage in insightful customer dialogues based on meaningful intelligence. 

These approaches to decision-making are all seen as relatively recent developments. This lesson from history presents a real example of how these approaches were all established back in the 1940s, far earlier than envisaged, to respond to the demands of a nation in crisis and relates these lessons back to today's world. 

In the last two weeks of May 1940, Winston Churchill was swept into power as a last resort. Within several weeks the Battle of France was lost and the Royal Air Force (RAF) sustained massive losses of 500 operational fighters. Churchill was now facing the prospect of an imminent invasion of the United Kingdom (U.K.). Churchill had to respond to the invasion threat and take the necessary steps. With 620 operational fighters, the RAF was well below its set target (in 1939) of 1,200 fighters, thought to be the minimum number needed to win an air battle over the U. K. 

Churchill brought in experts and listened to them. In the short term, aircraft production could not meet the demand in time. A potential solution was to maximize the effectiveness of how existing resources were used. For example, a sense and respond system could vector fighters to specific targets, and reduce the overall numbers required. If RAF pilots could fly multiple sorties per day (3-4) then the overall number of RAF fighters would start to match the German Luftwaffe numbers. This solution would have to handle large volumes of disparate data from multiple sources, and convert it into useful intelligence. The approach would require a high degree of organization and a data governance framework. 

Churchill was presented with the basic components of a sense and respond solution: 

• The code-breaking establishment at Bletchley Park had managed to break enemy encrypted codes previously thought unbreakable. Churchill knew firsthand the value of good intelligence, as the lack of it had been a major undoing for him at Gallipoli in the First World War. Churchill quickly recognized what Bletchley Park was capable of producing. If the code breaking was completed in a 24-hour window, it would provide invaluable information on enemy intent and threats. This would give RAF Fighter Command early warning of when raids would commence, their size and their likely targets. 

• RAF Fighter Command, or Bentley Prior, had invested in several areas. First, a hierarchy of identical operations centers was created at the group and sector levels. Second, a network of radar stations had been completed along the coastline with both short- and long-range capability. Radar was a technology that Churchill had personally supported the development of a few years earlier. Third, a network of visual observers and volunteer sky watchers from 1,000 posts was set up along the coastline and in the southeast. Integrating these components together would provide a tracking system capable of following aircraft from their take-off in France to flight paths over the British mainland. 

• Storey's Gate was an underground facility close to Downing Street. Churchill recognized the value of a secure, blast-proof site. This was to be his new headquarters for the rest of the war. From here, he would follow events from all theatres of battle and have a big picture view he could respond accordingly. 


Although much of the infrastructure was in place, the whole system had to be integrated, tested to breaking point, and made operational. Churchill prioritized all the above components and made further investments available: 

• At the code-breaking facility at Bletchley Park, the complex decoding method, done laboriously by hand, was simplified and given a code name "Ultra." It was then automated and scaled up using electro-mechanical machines, which dramatically speeded up the time required to decode and translate enemy codes (competitive intelligence). Ultra messages were also carefully harvested to form an extensive knowledge base of the order of battle, right down to the names of individual field commanders and squadron leaders. 

• At Bentley Prior, the filter room was the communication hub that aggregated disparate information collected from multiple sources (Ultra, radar, observers, operations centers and pilots). The information was integrated in real time and passed directly into the operations room where it was displayed in a sophisticated real-time event model called the map table, depicting the skies over the U.K. Color counters representing aircraft formations were sequenced to the operations room clock to provide five-minute increments of the evolving air battle overhead. This provided a sophisticated early warning system so decision-makers from the gantry could track the incoming raid. They could then use the tote model to determine what resources were available and how they could respond. The tote model reflected which squadrons in what sectors were ready and refueled to engage in immediate battle. Bentley Prior institutionalized decision making through the whole system of RAF operations centers at group and sector level. These real-time systems kept track of their squadrons, fighters and, most importantly, their current operational status, e.g., refueling, ready for take-off, in air or engaged in battle. 

• At Storey's Gate, a sophisticated map room was created for Churchill and chiefs of staff. It tracked real-time events from Bentley Prior, other theatres of war, and key performance indicators from the supply chain. The map room was a real-time executive dashboard. In the cabinet war room, Churchill and his chiefs collaborated to make decisions. The facility was equipped with good communications to quickly cascade actions out to the hierarchy of military, industrial, and civilian establishments. Churchill was so dependent on the map room that it was recreated in the carriage on his private train. 


How did this decision-making environment work? Storey's Gate became the center of the whole operation, managing the big picture, tightly integrated to Bletchley Park, Bentley Prior and the fighter supply chain. Based on accurate and timely information and intelligence, Churchill and his organization were better able to understand what was going on in the broader picture of the war. They followed the air battle, closely monitored the supply chain, and kept track of events from other battlefronts. They were better able to leverage all the resources at their disposal, select the best tactics and also determine the most promising strategies and projects. The result of the battle was favorable to the U.K. and the invasion was postponed to the spring of 1941. 


In today's world, what can we take away from this lesson from history? Churchill's use of executive dashboards, real-time event models, institutionalized decision-making and competitive intelligence analysis helped turn the course of history. It was the first time that intelligence had been used on such a scale, across an enterprise and in such a strategic capacity. More surprisingly, the system was completed and operational in several months. In considering your environment today, here are some questions to think about: 
• Is your information supply chain capable of rolling up all relevant information to one command source for a single enterprise view? 
• Are your decision-support systems institutionalized, and are your employees using these consistently for decision making?